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Abstract: Electric mobility and automation are important drivers for the future of the automotive industry. This
requires an extremely high level of safety, reliability, and eﬀiciency of the energy supply in the vehicle compared to the state
of the art. It is not possible to fulfill these requirements with today’s energy supply. To meet these requirements, a faultoperational, scalable powernet is needed. In this paper, a new methodology is presented for the development of powernet
for automated driving with electric vehicle. The new method enables the development of new fail operational powernet
topologies, early detection of failures in powernet components and the fulfillment of automated driving requirements.
With these new methods, many new topologies were developed, simulated and tested in the test bench and individual
steps are clarified with an example. The individual steps are analysis of requirements, development of the topology,
possible failures and combinations of failures in powernet components and simulation and test.
Key words: Electric vehicle, automated driving, energy storage, fault operational powernet, fault tolerant, topology

1. Introduction
There are different market analyses for the future of mobility. The market analysis shows that automatic
driving is to be introduced from 2025 [1]. Automated driving is a new market and requires a new concept and
components, such as new sensors and actuators. These actuators and sensors have to meet the high demands
on reliability, availability, safety, and operating profiles [2–4].
Today’s braking and steering [1] systems in vehicles are designed for fail-safe operation [5–9], since the
driver always represents a fallback level. If a safety-critical component in the vehicle, such as the brakes, fails,
the driver must use his muscle power to bring the vehicle to a safe state location by actuating the mechanical
brake lever.
In automated driving, a failure of the electrical supply in the car can lead to life-threatening situations.
For example, a component fault in the generator can cause the electrical power supply to fail [10]. As a result,
the remaining vehicle components can only be supplied with energy by the battery for a certain period of time
[10]. After a certain time, however, no more energy is available in the battery and thus no power supply is
guaranteed, which results in a system failure.
In automated driving (in accordance with SAE levels 4 & 5) [11], there is no longer an active driver or
the driver is no longer able to take over control of the vehicle or to park or secure the car in the event of a
system failure [12]. With today’s on-board powernet [5, 13, 14], it is not possible to meet the requirements of
automated driving.
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To ensure the safety of passengers and other road users, safety-critical functions must be developed
by the vehicle in accordance with the ISO 26262 standard [10], which also applies to the on-board powernet
functionality. The on-board powernet must be designed in such a way that in the event of a fault during
driving, safety-critical sensors and actuators (e.g., brake, camera) are reliably supplied by the powernet. The
abovementioned points require a fail operational powernet system [4, 9, 12].
In order to develop a safety-relevant, cost-effective, and scalable powernet, a new powernet topology [13,
15–17] and methodology was developed. This methodology enables a systematic, structured and standardized
development of the wiring system. The methodology consists of a chain of tools and analyses/evaluations and
phases that build on each other. Figure 1 shows the superordinate structure of this chain. This method for
each of the parts in Figure 1 is applied, implemented, and explained in the next chapter for details.

Figure 1. Structure of the new methodology for fail operational powernet development with different parts.

2. Requirements for powernet
The future powernet architectures [18] currently in series production and under discussion today are characterized by a great diversity both at the topology and component level. One reason for this diversity is
OEM-specific specifications and drivers, which are reflected in the powernet architecture from the vehicle level
and the respective powertrain concept.
Key drivers for the development of powernets are:
• Supply of high-load and comfort for consumers
• CO2 - Saving
• Safety-relevant functions (e.g., brake, steering)
Comfort
• Electrical roll stabilization
• Electric heated windshield
• Electrical air-conditioning compressor
• Comfort start with electric machine
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• Electric auxiliary heater positive temperature coeﬀicient (PTC)
CO2 saving
• Start-stop
• Start-stop sailing
• Recuperation of braking energy
• Boosting with electric machine or electric additional compressor
Safety relevance
• Start-stop sailing
• Automated driving (ISO26262 [10] and ECE-R [19])
Thus, requirements can be summarized on two levels, the legal level (laws, norms, and standards) and
the customer level (customer requirements and use case).
2.1. Legal requirements
In automated driving, according to SAE levels 4 & 5 [11], there is no driver or in case of a system failure the
driver is not able to take over the vehicle control. During automated driving, the electric brake system is fully
power-assisted. For the fully power-operated brakes, there is a law of the European brake standard ECE R13-H
[19]. This brake standard specifies a concrete approach to a solution for fully power-operated brakes. The
requirements of ECE R13-H regarding the braking system, therefore, also applies to automated driving.
ECE R13-H, section 5.2.2.8 [19]:
”if the service braking force and transmission depend exclusively on the use, controlled by the driver, of an
energy reserve, there must be at least two completely independent energy reserves, each provided with its own
transmission, likewise independent; each of them may act on the brakes of only two or more wheels so selected
as to be capable of ensuring by themselves the prescribed degree of secondary braking without endangering the
stability of the vehicle during braking; in addition, each of the aforesaid energy reserves must be equipped with
a warning device as defined, ……”
With reference to this law, today’s powernet policy is not suitable for automated driving. A new topology
must be developed for this purpose.
2.2. Requirements concerning standards and norms
If a system failure of the powernet occurs during automated driving, a life-threatening situation can arise for
both passengers and other road users. Therefore, the ISO26262 standard [20] requires that safety requirements
are met. The ”functional safety” requirement of the ISO26262 standard provides a solution-neutral framework
for the development of safety-relevant systems. In order to prevent system failure, safety-critical, sudden failures
must be detected with a certain diagnostic coverage according to ISO26262. For this purpose, different diagnostic
concepts must be provided for the use case of automated driving [4].
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2.3. Requirements at customer level and use case
There are new requirements for automated driving by customers and the Ethics Commission [21].

New

requirements are strongly related to the required safe stopping behavior. This is called safe stop location
(SSL) [22]. If a failure occurs during automated driving, according to SAE levels 4 & 5, the driver is no longer
able to bring the vehicle into a safe state. The SSL is defined for this purpose. This describes the behavior of
the vehicle in the event of a failure. A list of the defined SSL is shown in the following figure, Figure 2. The
achievement of a safe state depends on various factors, e.g., availability of energy requirements of the battery,
brake, steering [23], and drive.

Figure 2. Definition of the SSL for automated driving achievement of a safe state depends on availability of components,
e.g., drive, energy [22].

SSL 1 states that in the event of a fault, the vehicle must be able to drive on to home. This requires a high
residual energy in the energy storage system (powernet) as well as fail operational steering and fail operational
brakes and drive concepts.
SSL 7 defines the safe state by an emergency stop. All that is required is a fail-operational brake that
can bring the vehicle to a standstill. In order to supply fail-operational brakes, a fail-operational powernet is
required.
In the state of the art of powernet, the realization of automated driving is not possible. After analysis
of the literature, laws and customer requirements for automated driving, new demands arise. These new
requirements require a fail-operational powernet.
3. Topology
With the introduction of automated driving, the demands on the reliability of the electrical supply will become
even more stringent. Today’s vehicles are controlled or regulated via a mechanical and energetic fallback level
by the driver. However, since automated driving allows the driver to carry out nondriving activities, this
driver-based fallback level is no longer required. For this reason, the electrical supply has a safety relevance
that has not been known in the motor vehicle so far. A highly reliable, fail operational electrical powernet
topology is, therefore, an important prerequisite for the introduction of these systems. After analysis of the
1095
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laws and customer requirements, several powernet topologies are developed, evaluated, and specified with the
individual components. For example, four powernet topologies for automated driving are presented. The
powernet topology consists of many different parts (base, channel 1, and channel 2) as well as components,
Figure 3.

Figure 3. New fail-operational powernet topologies for electric vehicle with automated driving.

The difference is between the topologies. Topologies 1 and 2 have an additional battery ( B2 ) in channel
2 in order to avoid undervoltage for the redundant consumers ( R2a ). Topologies 3 and 4 have no extra battery
in channel 2. Topologies 1 and 3 have a 14V/HV DC/DC 2 in channel 2. 14V/HV DC/DC is more expensive
than 14V/14V DC/DC. Topologies 2 and 4 have a 14V/14V DC/DC 2 in channel 2. Therefore, Topology 2
is the more cost-effective option and provides more safety for safety-relevant functions ( R2a : e.g., brake and
steering).
The basic electrical system consists of inverter, electric machine (EM) and DC/DC converter (DC/DC 1),
high voltage (HV) battery ( BHV ) and high voltage consumer ( RHV , e.g., electric air conditioning compressor).
In addition to the basic powernet system, two additional supply channels 1 and 2 are implemented, each
with one battery ( BB ) for the redundant consumers ( R1a , R2a ). The coupling to the basic powernet is effected
by means of DC/DC converters or switches (coupling elements). The consumer group ( R1a , R2a ), which must
be supplied fault operational, is supplied from the two supply channels with the aid of coupling elements. The
redundant loads are usually safety loads (e.g., R1a : brake 1, R2a : brake 2). Consumer group R3 represents
consumers without safety relevance. The consumers ( R1a , R2a ) represent redundant safety-relevant consumers
for highly automated driving [8, 10], such as the control electronics of one of the two brake circuits. The
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additional channel 2 supplies the other part of the redundant consumers, e.g., the second brake circuit of the
vehicle.
The topologies shown here meet the requirements of ECE R13 [19] and can be implemented as an add-on
to the state of the art. These powernet structures for automated driving can of course also be used for 48/14 V
powernets. In this case, only one voltage level changes from high voltage (HV) to 48 V1 . In this case, the 48 V
and 14 V subnetwork have a common ground connection 1 . Thus, these new topologies are scalable to different
voltage levels.
4. Possible failures
The new fail operational powernet topology consists of various components, such as safety-critical consumers
(e.g., brake), comfort consumers (e.g., electrical roll stabilization), energy distributors, and energy generators
(Figure 3). Crucial for the design of a reliable powernet is the understanding of the causal chains of faults
and the identification of critical fault paths. Safety-critical faults must be investigated at component level and
system level. Each powernet component fault was identified, analyzed, and evaluated here. The possible failure
numbers are determined with failure mode and effects analysis and failure tree analysis, e.g., DC/DC 2 has 100
physical faults, see Figure 4.

Figure 4. Formation of a failure class from physical component failures (e.g., DC/ DC2 has 100 failures) with failure
databank.

5. Failure combinatory
Failure databank allows component failures and their effects as well as failure causes to be presented systematically and in a structured way. Thus, a database for component failures is created, Figure 4. There are
approximately 1200 physical powernet component faults. According to the ISO 26262 standard on functional
safety, the combination of two faults must also be considered. What does the failure structure look like? The
failure structure is shown in Figure 5. Failure structure consists of different levels. Level is a definition for
the system state (powernet state) whether there is a system failure or undetected fault. At each level, system
1 SynopsysSaberSynopsys.

Web site: https://www.synopsys.com/verification/virtual- prototyping/saber.html
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breakdown, undetected fault, and reaching the safe state status must be checked and corresponding measures
for system breakdown must be defined in order to bring the vehicle to a safe state location. The measures for
system breakdown must be defined and derived independently of the level.
1st level represents the initial state or there are no faults.
2nd level: A failure occurs during automated driving. This failure can be detected but may also remain
undetected.
3rd level: First, failure is detected. The vehicle must now drive to the safe state. There are two
possibilities for this: Either the vehicle manages to reach a safe state and then the action is finished, or before
reaching a safe state, a system failure occurs due to a fatal failure, e.g., failure of channels 1 and 2. The failure
structuring serves to systematically map the possible failures and their possible combinations up to the double
failure. Only the technically meaningful failure class combinations are taken into account. It can be seen from
this failure structure if the failures are not detected. Then the vehicle can no longer reach a secure state. Further
measures must, therefore, be derived. These measures consist of selecting the components and developing the
diagnostic concepts to detect these undetected faults.

Figure 5. Failure structure of powernet with different levels (powernet state).

6. Electrical simulation for fail operational powernet topology 2
In order to select and dimension the powernet components and to investigate the influence of the fault cases
on SSL, the topology must be simulated. For this purpose, a physical simulation model was generated with
Saber [24] for electrical powernet topology 2 (Figure 6). With topology 2 in channel 2, an extra battery ( B2 )
for the redundant consumers ( R2a ) has to be supplied. This provides more safety for this consumer ( R2a ) to
avoid undervoltage. Only channel 1 has a 14 V/HV DCDC1 (more cost-effective option). Simulation is used to
simulate various faults and evaluate their influences.
6.1. Simulation criteria and scenarios
The simulation shall examine the criteria of scenarios for voltage stability and load balance as well as fault
injection in the powernet. They are simulated with different parameters and components, see Figure 7.
1098

KILIÇ/Turk J Elec Eng & Comp Sci

Figure 6. Overview of simulation model in Saber for topology 2 for electric vehicle (14V/HV) [12].

Figure 7. Overview of simulation parameters, values and scenarios for voltage stability, load balance, and fault injection.
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6.2. Simulation voltage stability
Voltage stability means that no over- or undervoltage is applied to safety critical loads (e.g., brake, steering).
Figure 8 shows the results of the voltage stability from the VDA double lane change test [24] for safety-critical
consumers (brake and steering). With the VDA double lane change test, strong and simultaneous steering and
braking maneuvers are present. Therefore, undervoltage or overvoltage can be detected very well. The voltage
and current curves for channels 1 and 2 are shown in Figure 8. The selected components in channel 1 are not
well suited because there is an undervoltage in channel 1 or the requirement in channel 1 is not fulfilled because
there is an undervoltage for steering. The reason is that the simulated battery size was 30 Ah (Table 1). The
battery size or HV-DC/DC (DC/DC 1) size must be adapted.

Figure 8. First simulation results from voltage stability for topology 2 and for both channels with safety critical loads
(e.g., brake, steering).

Table 1. For the first simulation selected components for channels 1 and 2 with topology 2.

Component
14-V battery (BB )
14 V- DC/DC
HV-DC/DC

Channel 1
30 Ah
3,4 kW

Channel 2
30 Ah
200 W
-

There are no significant overvoltage or undervoltage in channel 2, which means that selected powernet
components (e.g., 14 V-DC/DC (DC/DC 2) or 14 V battery ( B2 )) in channel 2 are well suitable for automated
driving with topology 2.
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KILIÇ/Turk J Elec Eng & Comp Sci

In channel 1, there is an undervoltage in the steering ( R1a ). In order to avoid over- or undervoltage to
safety-critical loads, optimum component size must be selected. Therefore, a new component size was selected
and the voltage stability simulation was carried out. Table 2 and Figure 9 show the results of voltage stability
for double lane change test with adapted component size.
Table 2. Optimum selection of powernet components from simulation for topology 2.

Component
14-V battery
14 V- DC/DC
HV-DC/DC

Channel 1
70 Ah
3.4 kW

Channel 2
40 Ah
500 W
-

Figure 9. Second simulation results from voltage stability after adaptation of the component size for topology 2 and
for both channels with safety critical loads (e.g., brake, steering).

Channel 1 has a 3.4 kW HV/12 V DC/DC converter and a 70 Ah lead acid (PbAc) battery as power
sources. Dynamic consumers are brake and steering. There are no abnormalities or over- or undervoltage in
channel 1. The voltage is stable. The reason is that the 3.4 kW converter can react very fast to the dynamic
change of the load. In addition, the larger battery provides a larger buffer in the powernet.
6.3. Load balance simulation
The aim of the charge balance is to prevent the deep discharge of the battery and to prevent the overload of the
ground network components. From the simulation of the voltage stability, electrical quantities of the components
have been selected. However, an overload of the components has not yet been considered. Therefore, a charge
balance is available.
In order to avoid a deep discharge of the battery and an overload of the powernet components, the
charge balance must be simulated. Figure 10 shows the charge balance for worldwide harmonized light vehicles
test cycles (WLTC) driving cycles. With this given driving profile, the state of charge (SOC) conditions
for both batteries were simulated at different load (200...1200Watt), temperature (-20—20 ◦ C), and DC/DC
( 200 W... 1000 W).
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Figure 10. Simulation results from load balance according to WLTC driving profile for topology 2 and for both
12V-batteries ( BB and B2 ) [12].

Battery BB (30 Ah) shows a negative charge balance (Start SOC size (SOC 60%) smaller than end SOC
size (SOC 30%)). In channel 1, the power of DC/DC 1 is not enough to cover all loads. Battery BB is used
as buffer to provide energy. In worse case, the battery BB could be discharged. This represents a danger with
regard to the permanent guarantee of the starting ability. Battery size for BB must be adapted.
Battery B2 is charging because of the DC/DC 2. It is controlled to keep the voltage in channel 2 at a
suitable level. The energy of DC/DC 2 comes from channel 1. Battery B2 shows a positive charge balance.
The selected battery size is, therefore, well suited. The following safety measure is to prevent the case B2
approaches 100% SOC level: The DC/DC 2 can work bidirectional. In case of a high voltage, it can transfer
the energy from channel 2 to channel 1. The voltage in channel 1 can be controlled by DC/DC 1.
6.3.1. Options for selection of the powernet components for this topology
From the simulation results, the electrical characteristics/requirements of the individual components were
derived. In addition to the electrical parameters, the functional requirements and reliability of the individual
components can also be determined. The selection of the powernet components for topology 2 is given in
Table 2.
6.4. Fault injection simulation
The occurrence of channel and system failures was simulated by fault injection and tested on the test bench. For
this purpose, a flexible fault-operational powernet test bench was set up to test different voltage classes. This
test bench consists of a high-voltage and low-voltage (LV) circuit (Figure 11). The high-voltage (HV) circuit
was simulated with a dynamic HV source (storage, inverter (INVCON 2.3), electric machine, consumer and
HV battery) and was simulated as a whole with a dynamic HV source (power up to 10kW@1000V, max. 13A
(5kW@380V, max. 13A). The voltage is adjustable up to 1000 V. 14 V battery was simulated with a LV source
or represented by constants. General and safety-critical loads were simulated by dynamic electronic loads. One
of the converters was, therefore, the DC/DC converter of the power electronics INVCON 2.3 (inverter). For the
DC/DC converters, a circulating cooler was used.
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Figure 11. Different overviews for powernet test bench for high- and low-voltage with components, e.g., inverter, HV
source.

Here the static deviation of the DC/DC output voltage at different loads was checked. For this purpose, a
series of measurements and simulations were carried out and the results are presented here. The static deviation
of the output voltage for different 10.6 V, ... 14.3 V was performed at a constant DC/DC input voltage 250 V
and at different set loads (1 A, 15 A, ... 210 A) for different output voltages 10.6 V, 12 V, ... 14.3 V. The
deviation of the output voltage at partial load and full load was compared (Figure 12). The measurement and
simulation result are in very good agreement, as shown in Figure 11. Maximum deviation between measurement
and simulation is approximately 1% (0,158 V).

7. Conclusions
In this paper, a new methodology was described for the development of powernet for automated driving with
electric vehicle. The new method enables the development of new fail-operational powernet topologies, early
detection of vehicle failure, and the fulfillment of automated driving requirements. Some measurements were
used for online monitoring such as current and voltage.
A fail-operational, cost-effective, and scalable powernet in the expanding business of automated driving
offers significant competitive advantages. With today’s powernet, the realization of automated driving is not
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Figure 12. Comparison of the measurement and simulation results of the static deviation of DC/DC output voltage at
different loads (e.g., 1 A, 15 A, ... 210 A).

possible. Here the requirements were derived from laws, norms, standards, and customers for powernet. Based on
these requirements, various new fail operational powernet topologies were developed. With the newly developed
fail-operational on-board topologies, the fulfillment of the requirements has been proven by simulations and
measurements. These new topologies are scalable for different voltage levels. Laboratory-based test bench
is used for simulation comparison. Overall, for the concepts presented, there is a good agreement between
measurements and simulations.
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